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The theory of business cycles has been in a peculiarly unsettled
position since Keynes' General Theory first appeared. The older
students of the subject were, as a rule, concerned with the fluctua-
tions in business activity at large—not with the movements of a
particular economic factor such as production, employment, prices,
or incomes. Keynes shifted the emphasis violently in two direc-
tions. First, he made the level of employment his major interest.
Second, he concentrated on the factors that tend to make this level
at one time higher or lower than at another. Thus the funda-
mental unit of analysis became the 'volume of employment at any
time' rather than 'the business cycle.' This shift of emphasis was
well suited to the thirties, when unemployment overshadowed
every other economic and political problem. Before long Keynes'
theory was eagerly embraced and ingeniously simplified. Not only
business cycle theory but the theory of value itself fell for a time
by the wayside. For if Keynes was able to explain what determines
the volume of employment without troubling much about the
cost-price structure, some of his followers could do so without
troubling about it at all.
But economic life does not stand still, and ever)' change in its
underlying conditions sooner or later stimulates fresh economic
thinking. Under the impact of war and inflation during the forties,
theoretical interest in the behavior of prices, production, efficiency,
and the business cycle has slowly reemerged. Hicks' recent book
on the 'trade cycle' is a significant expression of renewed concern
with the cycle, in contrast to the level of employment.1 A funda-
mental task of modern economics, as Hicks sees it, is to pass from
the Keynesian theory of employment to a theory of business cycles.
And that is what he has set out to do. "It is... amistake," he tells
us, "to begin one's investigation with a definition of the kind of
fluctuation which one is going to regard as basic_deciding wheth-
er one is going to regard the cycle as being fundamentally a fluc-
tuation in employment, or output, or prices, or interest rates, or
money supplies. It is better to allow the definition to emerge as
the theory develops" (p. 2). This suggests that the interdepend-
ence of the money supply, costs, prices, profits, income disburse-
Reprinted by permission from The Journal of Political Economy (published by
the University of Chicago Press), February 1952,pp.1-24.
1J. R.Hicks, A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle (Oxford: Claren.
don Press, 1950).
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ments, consumer spending, investment, employment,and other
economic factors will be fully displayed in unfolding the drama
of the cycle. And if this suggestion carries a promise of useful
achievement, so too does Hicks' awareness of the hard road that
must be traveled in building knowledge. For while hebelieves he
has found the "main part of the answer" to the puzzle of business
cycles, he candidly describes his work as "little more than an un-
tested hypothesis" which will need to be tested "against the facts"
before it can be accepted as a basis for prescriptions of policy (p. v).
I
The literature on business cycles is rich in formal models. That
is hardly surprising in view of the widespread tendency to theorize
about the cycle with little regard for the facts of experience. Any
competent logician, especially if he has the command of mathe-
matics, can select a set of simplified conditions and deduce a cy-
clical path from what he has assumed. Hicks recognizes that such
a theory cannot be a "true theory" unless one can showthat the
causes it isolates "are actually those which are the most important
in practice" (p. 83). His objective is not a formal model of the
cycle but one that will enable us to make sense of our concrete
experiences. Hence, as he puts it, "it is...wiseto begin by at-
tempting to explain what has been experienced; anything else
must be a matter of prophecy, or at any rate, extrapolation" (p. 8).
But what precisely arethebusiness cycles of experience in which
Hicks' interest centers? And to what features or aspects of that
experience is his explanation directed? Early in his book (p. 2) he
notes that "the economic history of the last 150 years organizes
itself...easilyinto a series of 7- to 10-year cycles." On page 57 he
states that a 3 per cent annual "trend rate of growth ... seemsto
have been characteristic of the nineteenth century." On page 8g
he suggests that a perfectly uniform cycle superimposed on an ex-
ponential trend "is extraordinarily like the cyclical oscillation for
which we are looking"_that is, like the cycle "we find in reality"
during the past "two centuries." On page 2 he records that business
cycles "differ among themselves quite considerably; but there can
surely be no doubt of their family likeness." On pages 108-109, on
the other hand, he remarks that "certainly the cycles of reality do
not repeat each other; they have, at the most, a family likeness."
On page 3 he speaks of the "underlying repetitiveness" of the
business cycle; and on page 123 he suggests that the cycle is marked
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by a "fundamental regularity" on which "superficial irregulari-
ties" are "superimposed."
These remarks, and others like them, fail to convey a clear idea
of the economic nature or the historical range or the geographic
scope of the actual phenomenon or phenomena that Hicks is try-
ing to explain. Nor is it possible to infer with complete confidence
the temporal or spatial boundaries of the alleged cycles from the
institutions analyzed by Hicks, since his theory moves on an ex-
tremely abstract level. Hicks treats the real output of any period
as uniquely determined, except for a portion constituting "au-
tonomous investment," by the outputs of past periods. This, in a
sentence, is the essence of his theory of output; and his theory of
the business cycle is simply a theory of the cycle in output, despite
the wider scope suggested by the passage I have previously quoted.
Now a fixed link between past and current outputs, if it exists at
all, is no more a property of the economy of modern England than
of the economy of the modern Ukraine (or, for that matter, the
economy of Adam and Eve after they had strayed from virtue),
and it is not entirely clear that Hicks would be averse to lumping
them. To justify his assumption of a closed economy, he observes
that "after all, the world as a whole is a closed economy; and the
processes which the real theory studies are not made different in
character by the fact that they extend across national frontiers"
(p. 155). But if Hicks' theoretical arm really aims to stretch across
the world, I am not at all sure, judging from some long-range pro-
duction indexes I have seen, whether it could reach any actual
cycle in world output. One need not go back very far to find agri-
culture dominant in the world economy and its fluctuations in
different areas offsetting one another in the earthly aggregate. Such
offsetting is considerable even in industrial output and down to
the current day; though I have no doubt that an occasional catas-
trophe, like that of the 1930's, leaves its imprint on world output.
My main purpose in making these realistic observations is to
bring out the abstract character and limited objective of Hicks'
inquiry. Unless that is understood, a fair appraisal of his work is
impossible. It is no part of Hicks' problem whether business cycles
are five or ten or twenty years long, whether the amplitude of the
cycles is large or small, whether the cycles are of national or inter-
national scope, whether they extend over all or only a few of the
economic activities of a nation. We should not expect him to ex-
plain why business cycles in the United States have been shorter
than in England or more violent than in Germany, or why the
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United States and England experienced a cyclical downswing in
1920-192 1 and 1937-1938 while Germany did not, or whythe am-
plitude of a cyclical expansion in aggregate activity is rather
closely correlated with the amplitude of the preceding but not of
the following contraction, or why stock financing usually moves
with the cycle in aggregate activity while bond financing moves
contracyclically, or why the ratio of the change in inventory in-
vestment to the change in gross investment during a cyclical phase
tends to vary inversely with the length of the phase—or to explain
any of a hundred other features of the business cycles of experi-
ence. The essential object of Hicks' inquiry is the cycle in output
rather than the cycle in business activity as a whole; and this ob-
ject is sufficiently defined for his purpose by the generally familiar
facts that the aggregate production of industrialized nations has
fluctuated along a rising trend and that these fluctuations do not
look at all like random movements.
To explain the fluctuations in real output (or income), Hicks
makes effective use of the principles of the 'multiplier' and the
'accelerator,' as these terms have come to be used in recent litera-
ture. The 'multiplier mechanism' shapes the movements of con-
sumption in his model, while the 'accelerator' shapes the move-
ments of investment__except for a certain autonomous part.
Hence "the theory of the multiplier and the theory of the ac-
celerator are the two sides of the theory of fluctuations, just as the
theory of demand and the theory of supply are the two sides of the
theory of value"(p. 38).Asthese remarks may suggest, Hicks'
theory has severe modern lines, runs in terms of very broad..aggre-
gates, stresses technical connections between them, and reaches its
goal with only incidental reference to costs, prices, profits, or human
motivation. To evaluate Hicks' ingenious theoretical construction,
it is necessary to examine with some care its two main pillars—the
theory of the multiplier and the acceleration principle.
II
The theory of the multiplier goes back to Kahn and Keynes. In
earlier economic literature, we do not find any explicit 'consump-
tion function,' or a 'marginal propensity to consume' of less than
unity, or an 'investment multiplier' in the guise of a reciprocal of
'the marginal propensity to save.' All these are innovations of
modern theory, principally associated with the name of Keynes.
The older economists were, of course, more or less aware of the
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processes which the theory of the multiplier condenses into a
formula. They realized that an increase in investment would tend
to increase the flow of incomes, that the spending of all or a part
of the newly received income by the public would tend to gen-
erate new income, and that investment therefore has a multiplier
effect on consumption and national income. They did not, how-
ever, attach mechanically the dollars spent on 'consumption' to
the prior receipt of income any more than they attached the dol-
lars spent on 'investment' to any category of prior receipts. They
did not think of the multiplier as a determinate number which
summed up the effects of successive respendings of income, or
which defined a new equilibrium via a change in investment. Con-
fronted with the modern theory, they would have acknowledged
the processes telescoped in the multiplier, though they would have
expressed skepticism concerning the stability of the consumption
function and concerning a marginal propensity to consume that
is always less than unity. This, in any case—and here I can be
definite—was the position of Mitchell and Schumpeter. Nor do I
suppose that Keynes would have seriously disagreed with them in
the precise context of the theory of the cycle rather than of the
general level of employment. It is well to recall that in his famous
letter to Elizabeth Gilboy he explained that the assumption of a
marginal propensity to consume of less than unity was not a neces-
sary premise of his theory of employment; for, if the assumption
were not valid, it would merely follow that the economic system
is inherently unstable.2 And, of course, Keynes explained in The
General Theory that consumption was a function of several varia-
bles beside income (Chap. VIII), and actually developedsome
reasons (Chap. XXII, "Notes on the Trade Cycle") why the pro-
pensity to consume out of a given income would shift in the course
of a business cycle.
But the most striking and novel part of Keynes' work was the
formal theory of underemployment equilibrium, and here heper-
mitted himself to treat consumption as a numerically unique and
invariant implicate of income. It was, of course, this feature of
Keynes' work that caught the fancy of economists. For, if the step
was legitimate, economics was on the threshold of becoming an
engineering science. In the years immediately following publica-
tion of The General Theory the belief was widely held that,once
the desired level of income or employment was specified, theecon-
omist could tell to a good approximation what amount of invest-
2QuarterlyJournal of Economics, Vol. LIII(August1939), p. 634.
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ment—or of some practical equivalent—would bring that income
or employment into being. But, if the economist was to function
as an engineer, he needed good empirical estimates of the con-
sumption function. Thus under Keynes' influence extensive re-
search on the relation between consumer spending and national
income got under way. At first the results looked very promising,
for the correlation between consumption and income turned out
to be remarkably high. As the research moved forward, it ap-
peared however that the computed value of the marginal propen-
sity to consume was sensitive to comparatively slight shifts in the
character of the underlying data, to slight shifts in the period
covered by the statistics, and to shifts from annual data to quar-
terly or vice versa. Not only that, but it became increasingly plain
that the critical matter for purposes of control on Keynesian lines
was the savings function rather than the consumption function,
and that the correlation between savings and income was decided-
ly lower than between consumption and income. Under the pres-
sure of empirical studies, faith in an early engineering science of
economics perceptibly weakened. Numerous investigatorsleft
Keynes' precise formulations behind them, and immersed them-
selves in exploring the facts of consumption and disentangling the
numerous forces that influence the spending of consumers and the
saving of individuals and business firms.
But, while many took the path of empirical inquiry, others de-
voted themselves to refining Keynes' consumption function and
elaborating its theoretical implications. Hicks' contribution clearly
belongs in this compartment. His consumption function links con-
sumption exclusively to aggregate income as does Keynes', but the
relation is not the same. Keynes' consumption and income are
expressed in a wage unit, while Hicks' are expressed in an output
unit. Keynes' income is gross of depreciation allowances, while
Hicks' is net. Keynes' income is current income, while Hicks' is a
set of past and current incomes. The first of Hicks' modifications
is capable of leading to analysis of productivity as well as employ-
ment changes, and Hicks rightly attaches importance to this. The
second modification seems less fortunate from the viewpoint of
realistic analysis; for in the Keynesian version a change in gross
investment will tend to generate a change in consumption and net
income even if net investment is constant, while this cannot hap-
pen in Hicks' version. However, both the one modification and
the other have merely formal consequences within the range of
Hicks' inquiry. What does make a substantial difference is the
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consumption lag. At this point Hicks' work links up with the
empirical branch of post-Keynesian investigation_as represented,
for example, by the researches of Ezekiel, Duesenberry, Modi-
gliani, and Ruth Mack, who have stressed the influence of past in-
come on current consumption. It appears, therefore, that there is
good empirical justification for Hicks' twist to the consumption
function; and it also opens the road to process analysis_a road
that every student of business cycles must sooner or later follow.
To show how the 'multiplier mechanism' shapes the movements
of consumption, it is necessary to have in mind some rule about
investment. Hicks explores whole families of such rules. Thus he
allows investment to shift from one steady level to another, and
shows how—under various assumptions about the consumption
lag_consumption and income will adjust to the investment path.
Consider the following elementary case. Consumption in any
'period' is, say, nine-tenths of the income (or output) of the pre-
ceding period; in period o current output is in 'equilibrium' with
investment at 5 and consumption at 45; then, for some reason, in.
vestment in period i shifts to io, and this level of investment is
maintained in later periods. It follows, as a matter of arithmetic,
that consumption in periods i, 2, 3, etc., will be 45, 49.5, 53.55,
etc., converging to a value of go; that the corresponding series for
output will be 55, 59.5, 63.55, etc., converging to a value of ioo;
that the increase in consumption ultimately becomes 45, or nine
times as much as the increase of investment, while the increase in
output ultimately becomes 50, or ten times as much as the increase
of investment. This, or course, is the Kahn theory of the multi-
plier; but Hicks generalizes it to cover consumption lags of any
degree of complexity. Besides, he shows with exemplary skill how
consumption and income will respond when investment follows
a more complicated path_as when it expands progressively, con-
tracts progressively, or undergoes periodic fluctuations. The re-
suit is a very elegant generalization of the multiplier theory.
Hicks' lucid prose enables even the nonmathematical reader to
see that, as he moves from one situation to the next, the multiplier
3 M. Ezekiel, "Statistical Investigations of Saving, Consumption, and Investment,"
American Economic Review, Vol. xxxii (March 1942); F. Modigliani, "Fluctuations in
the Savings-Income Ratio," in Vol. xi of Studies in Income and Wealth by the Con-
ference on Research in Income and Wealth (National Bureau of Economic Research,
1949); Ruth Mack, "The Direction of Change in Income and the Consumption
Function," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. xxx (November 1948); J.S.
Duesenberry, Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behavior (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1949).
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mechanism keeps ticking away without pause or misadventure. It
always includes two 'parts'—a rigid consumption function, some
rule about investment, and nothing else. It is well to stop and
examine each part because in Hicks' theory the multiplier mech-
anism is not a mere tool of analysis but the whole—or at least the
preponderant part—of what needs to be understood about the
economics of consumption in the cycle of experience. With re-
spect to the first part of the mechanism, it may be asked what basis
Hicks has for treating consumer spending as if it were a purely
passive response to past and current income. Is it proper, to be
more specific, to ignore the influence of changes in income distri-
bution on consumer spending? Hicks disposes of this question by
remarking (p. 6) that his consumption lag already allows for a
changing income distribution, but he does not supply any rea-
sons to bolster the naked assertion. Again, is it proper to ignore
the vicissitudes of corporate and other nonpersonal saving in
formulating the relation of consumer spending to total national
income? Hicks apparently feels that the consumption lag also dis-
poses in principle of this complication, the reason being that "un-
distributed profits are in principle temporary"(p. 22). Surely,
when he writes in this vein, Hicks cannot be thinking of the finan-
cial processes whereby small firms in this country or England have
grown large. And what of the other factors that have been troubling
empirical investigators of the consumption function? How and in
what degree is consumption influenced by movements of the price
level? by changes in relative prices? by capital gains or losses? by
the stock of liquid assets or other accumulation from past effort?
by the terms on which consumer credit is extended? by expecta-
tions concerning income or price changes in the near future? by
the rate at which new families are being formed and other demo-
graphic variables? If national output equals the sum of consump-
tion and investment, are government expenditures on currently
produced commodities and services to be split in some fashion
between consumption and investment? If so, is consumption still
to be expressed as a simple function of past and current income?
Hicks does not comment on these issues. I assume his position is
that, while they may need to be considered in examining long
periods, they can be safely ignored over the period of a business
cycle. But, if that were the case, one should be able to make a good
short-run forecast of savings from a consumption function of
Hicks' type. To my knowledge the statistical literature on the
consumption function, which already includes some experiments
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on Hicks' lines, does not justify a strong faith in that possibility.
I find it difficult to suppress the feeling that Hicks' theory of con-
sumption is quite inadequate and that this part of his multiplier
mechanism limps as a consequence.
But what of the second part of the mechanism? This, it will be
recalled, is the rule about investment; and here the basic question
is what economic forces can be relied on to maintain any particu-
lar rule and how they do so. Surely, some theory of production is
implicit in the multiplier mechanism, but Hicks does not tell
what it might be. To go back to our preceding illustration, what
are the economic incentives or pressures that will keep real in-
vestment at the assumed figure of 1o?Or, to put the same question
another way, how is it possible for real output to exceed real con-
sumption, period after period, by the exact figure of io? It seems
clear that the multiplier theory requires that an increase or de-
crease in demand during any period be precisely matched by an
adjustment of supply; but how is this adjustment achieved? Are
we to assume that every firm has a perfectly elastic supply schedule
until the 'ceiling' to output is reached? That monopoly is absent
or that its presence can make no difference to the process of ad-
justing supply to demand? That no businessman ever makes a
mistake or that errors and other obstacles to proper adjustment
cancel out? Until the theory of production secreted in the multi-
plier mechanism is made explicit, there is bound to be a lingering
suspicion that the mechanism is merely a stimulating suggestion
of how the arithmetic of certain economic quantities may work
Out. Unless I have missed something vital in Hicks' theory of the
multiplier, that is the point at which he leaves it. To be sure, in
his model of the cycle the rule about investment flows from a
theory of investment process; but, as we shall see, this theory is
confined to the demand side of investment and takes for granted
conditions of supply except for the recognition of a 'ceiling' to
output and a 'floor' to investment.
III
The theory of the multiplier is "only a half-theory"(p. 38) in
Hicks' system. The other and accented half is the acceleration
4 A careful statistical analysis of how well various consumption and savings func-
tions have fared as forecasting devices has been made by Robert E. Ferber, "A Study
in Aggregate Consumption Functions" (unpublished University of Chicago disserta-
tiOn, 1951). [A revised version was published by the National Bureau as Technical
Paper 8, 1953.]
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principle. So strong is this emphasis that at times the multiplier
seems to fade out. For example, we read that "the multiplier theory
does in itself offer no shadow of an explanation why fluctuations
occur" (p. 3i)_which is true only if we treat consumption as a
rigid function of income and interpret fluctuations to mean re-
versals in direction. Again, we read that, when "the multiplier
mechanism...isanalyzed completely," it "proves...tobe a
stabilizing influence; its general tendency is to diminish the pro-
pensity to fluctuate"(p. 37). This suggests that, if consumption
were entirely independent of income, the economy would undergo
larger absolute fluctuations than it does in fact; but Hicks cannot
mean that. Probably all that he wishes to convey is, first, that the
rise or fall in consumption resulting from the multiplier mech-
anism is not so large in the presence of a consumption lag as it
would be in its absence; second, that "the fluctuations in consump-
tion... canat the most only reflect initiating fluctuations in in-
vestment" (p. 37; my italics). But how do the fluctuations in invest-
ment arise? Hicks' answer is that they are in part autonomous but
primarily a response to the rate of change in total output. Hence
the big half of the theory of the cycle is the acceleration principle.
It is necessary to pin down the meaning of the acceleration prin-
ciple, for shades of difference in its interpretation can make a
good deal of difference in one's judgment of what the principle
contributes to the explanation of business cycles. Everyone appre-
ciates that, if the output of a firm grows substantially, it may find
that its 'fixed plant' is cramped and that beyond a certain point
production cannot increase at all unless the plant is expanded. It
is equally clear that, if production is sharply reduced on account
of a drop in sales, the firm will have 'surplus capacity' on its hands
and there will be no immediate technical reason for adding to its
plant. If the acceleration principle meant no more than this, there
would be no reason to doubt its validity. Everyone could agree
that it has some bearing on investment and that no explanatin
of the cycle which ignored it could possibly be complete.
Doubt enters the moment the acceleration principle becomes
more imperial than this, and there has been a certain tendency
on the part of economic theorists to make it both imperial and
mechanical by postulating a fixed ratio between the stock of real
capital and current real output. On this interpretation the curve
of net investments becomes, except for a multiplicative factor ('the
investment coefficient') and a possible lag, a replica of the curve
5Iassume here, for simplicity, that replacement equals depreciation.
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of the rate of change in output. Thus put, the acceleration prin-
ciple is still capable of interpreting broad secular changes in real
investment, especially when industrial techniques change slightly
and gradually. For while the durability of capital goods_such
as factories, office buildings, machinery, and other equipment—
may make their stock inelastic on the side of decrease, and the
heavy cost of additions may make the stock inelastic on the side
of increase, these are limitations of the short run. Let enough time
pass and a plant that is poorly adapted to the average run of out-
put will shrink or grow; so that, in the absence of a great change
in technology, the stock of capital will tend to correspond, more or
less, to the trend of output.
The question from the viewpoint of the business cycle is whether
the adjustment of capital to output can be at all effective in the
short run. Here we bump on two critical facts. First, the rate of
utilization of industrial capacity, and therefore the extent of sur-
plus capacity, is itself a cyclical phenomenon. Second, cyclical ex-
pansions or contractions in over-all economic activity rarely last
longer than two or three years. Over periods of this brief duration
an improvement in the ratio of output to 'capacity' cannot well
come from a diminution of capital; it must come principally from
an increase of output. New additions to effective capacity do not
cease when a cyclical expansion of output stops. On the contrary,
they are apt to continue increasing, since some time must elapse
before investment expenditures materialize in installations. To
be sure, the existing stock of capital deteriorates through use
and obsolescence, but this is a slow process and not one to be
counted on to offset the new installations. As an empirical mat-
ter, we know that the stock of capital in the United States, if not
also in other countries, has as a rule continued to grow even
in periods of depression. It would seem, therefore, that a theory
which presupposes a fixed ratio of net investment in fixed capital
to the rate of change in output_whether as an approximation to
industrial fact or to entrepreneurial design—may well miss the
forces that, over the short run, dominate such investment.
Hicks is aware of this difficulty, and he attempts to meet it by
immobilizing the acceleration principle over a part of the cycle.
He not only recognizes, but formally incorporates into the struc-
ture of his model "the fact that falls in output cannot induce dis-
investment in the same way as rises in output induce investment"
(p. 83); that is, if output shrinks, gross investment in fixed capital
can at the most fall to zero, and while net investment may become
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negative, it can do so only to the extent of the depreciation
charges. Hence, except for inventories, Hicks restricts the accel-
eration principle to a stretch of the cycle_the latter stages of
expansion and the beginning of contraction. Over this part of the
cycle the accelerator is assumed to work on the plan made familiar
by the mathematical theorists; but even here Hicks attends ex-
plicitly to the factor of time. His position is that, if output in-
creases, "investment will not take place all at once—it will be
spread over a certain length of time, partly because businessmen
will not react at once to the need for new capital goods, partly
because the process of making the new capital goods itself takes
time" (p. 40). Suppose that output moves from ioo in period o
toi 10 in period i and that this development occurs at a time
when the capital of the economy is not "in excess of requirements"
(p. 105). The increase in output will then induce new investment
of lOX, where x is the investment coefficient. This investment will
not be made in period i; it will come in period 2, or perhaps in 3,
or perhaps partly in 2 and partly in 3, or in some other period or
set of periods; in other words, the investment lag may be simple
or complex.° But, whatever the lag, Hicks assumes it to remain
unchanged over intervals relevant to the cycle, just as he assumes
the investment coefficient to be constant.
The economic system that emerges from Hicks' theory is there-
fore governed by a fixed investment function as well as by a fixed
consumption function. The consumption function—and hence
the multiplier—is operative throughout the cycle. The investment
function—and hence the accelerator—is dormant during part of
the cycle. Nevertheless, the accelerator is the chief cycle-maker in
Hicks' theory. The business cycle, "regarded as a periodical fluc-
tuation in output, can be explained," he holds, "in terms of simple
reactions, by entrepreneurs and by consumers, which are not in
any mysterious sense psychological, but are based upon the tech-
nical necessities of a capital-using economy" (p. 117). The gen-
eral meaning of this central proposition seems unmistakable. "The
technical necessities of a capital-using economy" are its need to
enlarge or diminish the stock of real capital as output changes;
net investment is the actual change in the stock of capital; the
6InHicks' mathematical appendix current consumption depends on past outputs,
not on current output; his literary exposition stresses current output as much as past
outputs. In his appendix current investment depends on the change in past outputs,
not on the change in current output; and (except at one point, p. 6i) this is also
true of his literary exposition. I therefore follow Hicks' appendix on the theory of
investment and his text on the theory of consumption.
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rate of change in output induces the investment or disinvestment;
variations in consumption reflect the variations in investment; the
"technical necessities" of the economy thus propel its movements;
and the acceleration principle rationalizes the "technical neces-
sities." In Hicks' language: "The main cause of fluctuations is to
be found in the effect of changes in output (or income) on invest-
ment. There is nothing new in this contention; it is...nothing
else but the familiar 'Acceleration Principle' which already has a
long history. But it does not seem ...thatthe consequences of
this principle have hitherto been developed in a completely con-
vincing manner" (p. 7).
Hicks has surely made the acceleration principle more convinc-
ing by allowing for the phenomenon of surplus capacity. This
bold step in the direction of realistic cycle analysis is blunted,
however, by the aggregative character of his adjustment. The
change in output that counts in his theory is the change in aggre-
gate output, regardless of the mixture of pluses and minuses in
individual sectors of the economy. But since, as he has properly
argued, "falls in output cannot induce disinvestment in the same
way as rises in output induce investment" (p. 83), it is wrong to
allow a plus to be annihilated by a minus. Imagine two industries
of about the same size whose respective outputs trace out an iden-
tical cyclical path. Let A be a single-firm industry all of whose
plants are geographically bunched, while B numbers a thousand
scattered firms operating on competitive lines. Assume, further,
that every firm adjusts its investment in plant and equipment ac-
cording to the rate of change in its output as long as its stock of
capital is not in "excess of requirements." If A happens to be op-
erating at 50 per cent of capacity, no new investment need or will
be undertaken. But the same figure for B is merely a statistical
average derived from the percentages for a thousand firms, some
of which may be as low as zero and others as high as ioo. The
firms that have forged ahead in the competitive struggle may be
operating at or close to "full capacity," and the low industry
average will be no bar to launching extensions of their individual
producing capacities. Suppose that six months later the ratio of
output to capacity rises from 50 to 75 per cent in both A and B.
Then the number of B firms operating at or close to full capacity
may well be higher and the investment undertaken in the indus-
try larger, while investment in A continues at a standstill. It is
clear, therefore, that both the timing and the volume of invest-
ment may be very different in two industries, although their ag-
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gregate outputs move similarly and everyone's investment is in
line with Hicks' version of the acceleration principle. It follows
that the curve of "induced investment," which Hicks derives from
the aggregate output of the economy, bears no determinate rela-
tion to the desired curve, which can be gotten only by going to
the outputs of individual sectors.
Hicks' handling of the acceleration principle would be free
from this defect if the individual outputs all moved in the same
direction, or if there were full mobility of capital from one sector
to another. In the latter case there would even be no need for
concern over the size of the capital-output ratio. Of course, the
real world is nothing like that. The ratio of capital to output is
somewhat higher in agriculture than in manufacturing, is very
much larger for public utilities than for manufacturing, and
varies extensively over the field of manufactures. Since the dis-
tribution of investment among industries varies considerably both
within a cycle and from one cycle to another, there is no empirical
justification for Hicks' constant investment coefficient. Nor is
there any empirical warrant for treating aggregate output as if
it summarized a set of individual outputs always keeping the
same direction. Even during the catastrophe of the earlyi 930's
the outputs of a not inconsiderable number of American products
increased in volume. In general, the milder the cyclical phase,
the more extensive is the crisscrossing of individual sectors; but,
whatever the amplitude of the cycle, the crisscrossing of individual
outputs is itself a cyclical phenomenon. "Whereas the proportion
of expanding activities moves in the same direction as the aggre-
gate in the early stages of a business cycle expansion or contrac-
tion, it moves in the opposite direction in later stages. The pro-
portion of expanding activities is already declining months before
aggregate activity reaches a peak, and is already rising months
before the aggregate reaches its trough.' '8 To reckon with these
facts, Hicks would need to activate the accelerator, though in
shifting degree, over the entire cycle_instead of releasing it fully
over one stretch of the cycle and immobilizing it over another.
A revision of Hicks' accelerator along these lines, while it would
deepen his theory of the cycle, would not necessarily change the
7 There is an interesting tabulation of the rates of change in output of 407 com-
modities from 1929 to 1933 and 1933 to 1937 in Appendix E of the Temporary Na-
tional Economic Committee's The Structure of Industry, Monograph No. 27.
S A. F. Burns, "New Facts on Business Cycles," Thirtieth Annual Report of the
National Bureau of Economic Research (1950), p. ii. [The essay is reprinted above,
pp. 107-134.]
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broad conclusions. Under certain simple assumptions concerning
the distribution of a change in aggregate output among individ-
ual sectors, it can be shown that my reformulation of Hicks' ac-
celerator actually strengthens its cyclical power at downturns and
gives it an active role even at recoveries__a stage where his ac-
celerator is found hibernating. It might be interesting, and per-
haps instructive, to develop these theoretical implications. For
present purposes, however, it is more important to see that Hicks'
acceleration principle, even after adjusting it to allow for declines
in individual outputs, remains a rigidly technological theory of
investment; and that, unless good evidence is brought in its sup-
port, it may misdirect our thinking about the short-term changes
that are the essence of the business cycle. Hicks' principal justi-
fication of the acceleration principle seems to be that, unless the
capital stock is expanded to accommodate an increase in output,
it will be necessary to use the existing "capital equipment at more
than its optimum intensity"(p. 39). Reasoning along these lines
may justify faith in the acceleration principle as an explanation
of long-run tendency. But the accelerator of Hicks' model is sup-
posed to do its work in successive short periods, and I do not
think it can be frusted for this purpose.
The capital goods that count in modern business—factories,
power plants, shipyards, dwellings, locomotives, large machinery,
and the like_ordinarily take months or years to produce. They
are costly and, once acquired, may last a decade, a generation, or
still longer. A decision to invest in goods of this character is much
too important to be left to routine or some mechanical rule, like
the rate of change in output. If an increase in output occurs, no
one can be sure whether it represents a transitory or a permanent
change in business conditions. No one can therefore be sure wheth-
er an addition to the capital stock is justifiable. A decision to make
or not to make a new investment in capital is reached through
the exercise of business judgment—that subtle and as yet little
understood process whereby a businessman combines his knowl-
edge of what seems to be the relevant past with his estimates of
the present and his hopes, fears, and dreams of the future. One
firm may respond to the increase in output by ordering promptly
an expansion of capital facilities; another may decide to wait and
see. For the time being both will have to get on with the existing
plant and put up with marginal costs that may have become un-
comfortably high. If the increase in output proves 'transitory,'
the first firm will be saddled with the cost of maintaining an ex-
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cessive plant. If the increase proves 'permanent,' the second firm
will miss the opportunity of participating adequately in the ad-
vance of prosperity and will perhaps do a year or two later what,
in the absence of uncertainty, it would have done sooner. But no
firm is likely to deem it worth while to reappraise its capital stock
in the light of every change in output. For, in the first place, the
rate of change in output_whether taken by the month, or quar-
ter, or year—moves rather erratically in practice. And, in the
second place, instruments of production are divisible only to a
limited degree. A ship, turbine, or locomotive, a new factory, or
a wing added to an old factory can vary in size considerably; but
unless each conforms to some rough standard of efficiency, it be-
comes a toy, not an instrument of production.
In view of the imperfect divisibility of industrial facilities and
their long period of gestation, the additions to fixed capital made
by the individual firm come in substantial lumps.9 May it not be,
however, that the discontinuities, defiections, and irregular lags
of the individual case tend to iron out when aggregates are struck,
so that aggregate investment corresponds fairly closely to the rate
of change in aggregate output? In other words, may not the ac-
celeration principle fit badly the investment behavior of individ-
uals and yet fit neatly investment in the aggregate? This result is
conceivable. But the theorists who emphasize the acceleration
principle_Hicks among them—have not addressed themselves to
the question of how such a result may be brought about. In any
event, it seems doubtful if a question of this sort can be handled
with much assurance on a speculative plane alone. The problem
must be settled, if it can be settled at all, by seeing what the facts
show.
This matter has received some attention from empirical in-
vestigators_notably Kuznets, Tinbergen, and Hultgren.'° I think
it is fair to say that they have not found any substantial statistical
support for the acceleration principle, taken as a general theory
of investment in fixed capital over the business cycle. My own
statistical searchings, which have covered a fair time span and
9Seebelow, Sec. v, for a further analysis of the investment process and of the
limitations of the acceleration principle.
10SimonKuznets, "Relation between Capital Goods and Finished Products in the
Business Cycle," in Economic Essays in Honor of Wesley Clair Mitchell (Columbia
University Press, i935); J. Tinbergen, Statistical Testing of Business-Cycle Theories:
A Method and Its Application to Investment Activity (Geneva: League of Nations,
igg); Thor Hultgren, American Transportation in Prosperity and Depression (Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 1948), Chap. vi.
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range of industries, have led me to the conclusion that the cyclical
movements of this type of investment are rather closely geared to
the output of an industry but not to the rate of change in its out-
put. None of these statistical results, however, is decisive from the
viewpoint of Hicks' version of the acceleration principle. To test
that version faithfully it would be necessary to convert his "period"
into a unit (perhaps a changing unit) of calendrical time, to trans-
late the unspecified structure of his investment lag into some con-
crete equivalent, and to delimit the historical intervals within
which the acceleration principle is supposed to be active and
those within which it is supposed to be dormant. These are formid-
able difficulties; but they are minor compared with still another
hurdle that the statistician would need to overcome_namely, to
separate out the "induced" part of investment from the "autono-
mous" part.
It will be recalled that Hicks does not attribute all investment
to the rate of change in output. This distinction belongs solely
to induced investment, to which autonomous investment must be
added to get the whole of investment. But how is induced invest-
ment to be identified in the course of an empirical test of the ac-
celeration principle? It would obviously not do to estimate it
from the rate of change in output and to call the rest of investment
"autonomous." This would be traveling in a circle. But if we start
at the other end and seek to estimate autonomous investment di-
rectly, we are handicapped by the lack of a definition. Hicks' "au-
tonomous investment is only autonomous with respect to the mul-
tiplier and accelerator mechanism" (p. 120), but this merely tells
us what autonomous investment is not. His only positive identifi-
cation is through the medium of illustrations: "Public investment,
investment which occurs in direct response to inventions, and
much of the 'long-range' investment...whichis only expected
to pay for itself over a long period, all of these can be regarded as
Autonomous Investment for our purposes" (p. 59). This leaves us
uncertain what kind or how much of the long-range investment
is autonomous; whether the installation of improved machinery,
if it happens to follow an expansion of output, belongs to the in-
duced or autonomous category; and whether investment associated
with railroading, mining coal, distributing mail, etc.is to be
counted as autonomous when conducted by a public enterprise
but as induced when conducted by a private enterprise. And while
Hicks is to be commended for returning to realism at the close of
his book, he seems to whittle his own distinction away when he
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declares that "by the exercise of foresight, investment which would
naturally have been of the induced type... canbe transferred
to a time at which it is more convenient" and that "bythis means
induced investment is, in effect, converted into autonomous in-
vestment" (p. i68).
It is precisely the element of foresight that to me seems de-
cisive in the short-run variations of investment,1' in contrast to
Hicks' "technical rigidities"(p. kg). A new invention, a change
in relative prices, an expansion in output, or some other factor or
combination of factors may stimulate a decision to invest, but
there is always some technical as well as business leeway in the
timing of the investment. Investment in plant and equipment is
governed, in the short run, by foresight, not by technical rigid-
ities; practically all of it is "autonomous," practically none of it
is "induced"—if we are to use Hicks' terminology. The "tech-
nical necessities" that Hicks sees in the acceleration principle are
undoubtedly significant to the economist in analyzing secular
trends of investment; also in connection with the long swings
lasting from about fifteen to twenty-five years—such as have char-
acterized residential construction in our own and other countries.
Even over the short periods of the business cycles these technical
necessities help to explain the behavior of certain categories of
inventory investment—particularly, of goods in process.'2 Thus a
mechanical acceleration principle has its place in economic analy-
sis; but its role in the business cycle of experience is much more
modest than in Hicks' model.'3
Iv
"Thecrucial question which a theory of the cycle has to ask,"
as Hicks sees it, "is whether fluctuations are possible,and if so,
how they are possible, in the absence of exogenous disturbances"
(p. 63). From the viewpoint of this question it need notmuch
matter how long the cycles in output may actually be, or how far
back they go in history, or in what parts of the world they may
be found, or what shape they characteristically assume, or in what
degree different industries participate in the successive stages of
the over-all cycle, or how the cycle in output may be related to
11 Cf. J.S.Duesenberry, 'Hicks on the Trade Cycle," Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. i.xiv (August 1950), pp. 473-475.
12 See M. Abramovitz, Inventories and Business Cycles, with Special Reference to
Manufacturers' Inventories (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1950), Chaps.
viii and xvi.
13 See Sec. v, below.
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prices, profits, employment, or other economic factors. But Hicks
appreciates that what he regards as the "crucial question" is by
no means the only question which a theory of the cycle has to ask.
Necessary though it be to develop "some reasons why the eco-
nomic system may be liable to cyclical fluctuations," the fact of
fluctuations must yet be traced to the causes "which are the most
important in practice"(p. 83); in other words, it must be de-
pendably linked to other facts.
In his quest for an explanation Hicks passes from the general
behavior of output to the special case of a cycle in output, first
through a model that allows output to move freely, then through
a model that constrains the movements of output. I shall not at-
tempt to sketch the details of the theory, or to show how much
and how ingeniously Hicks has added to the work of other the-
orists who have concerned themselves with the interaction of the
multiplier and acceleration principles—notably, Harrod and Sam-
uelson.' For present purposes it will suffice to convey the general
character of Hicks' theory and to show why he concludes that "in
the real theory it is the accelerator which is ultimately responsible
for producing the cycle"(pp. 136-137).
Let us suppose that the economic system is in stationary equilib-
rium, with consumption at ioo and net investment atzero. As-
sume also that the consumption of any period depends on the
income (or output) of the preceding period; that the investment
of any period depends on the change in output during the preced-
ing period; that the marginal propensity toconsume from the
income of the previous period is o.9; and that the investment
coefficient is 0.2. Let the equilibrium now be disrupted through
an autonomous investment of 5, which comes in period i and
never turns up again. What will be the consequences of this soli-
tary disturbance? In period i consumption remains at its equilib-
rium value of 100; and, since autonomous investment is5, total
output is 105. In period 2 consumption becomes 104.5; autono-
mous investment is zero; but, since output has increased by 5 from
period o to period i, there is now an induced investment of
5X0.; hence total output is105.5. In period 3 consumption
rises to 104.95; induced investment falls to o.i and total output to
105.05. In period 4 consumption falls to 104.545; induced invest-
ment becomes a negative quantity, —0.09, and total output
14R.F. Harrod, The Trade Cycle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936); Paul A. Sam-
uelson, "Interactions between the Multiplier Analysis and the Principle of Accelera-
Lion," Review of Economic Statistics, Vol. xxi (May 1939).
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104.455. In later periods output continues to decline but ap-
proaches more and more closely its equilibrium value of 100.
Thus, after an initial kickup, the system converges to equilibrium.
But if we had allowed the investment coefficient to be o.6 instead
of 0.2, other things remaining the same, the result would be quite
different. Output would first rise for a time, then decline below
the equilibrium value of ioo, later rise again but to a lower peak,
fall again but a to higher trough, and so on; thus equilibrium
would be approached only after a series of oscillations. If the in-
vestment coefficient were as high as i, the system would convert
the initial disturbance into a cycle of constant amplitude around
the initial equilibrium value. If the coefficient were somewhat
higher, cycles of progressively increasing amplitude would emerge;
and if the coefficient became sufficiently high (i.e., if it exceeded
1.73), the system would move "relentlessly away from equilib-
rium" (p. 71)_upward if the solitary disturbance were positive,
as in our illustration; downward if the disturbance were negative.
It seems clear therefore that, "even if there are no exogenous
causes making for fluctuations" (p. 84), a cycle may be generated
by the multiplier-accelerator mechanism.
But Hicks wishes to portray cycles against a rising trend of out-
put, since "the cycles which have been experienced have all of
them taken place against a background of secular expansion" (p.
8). With this in mind, he proceeds to show that "the deviations of
actual output from equilibrium output have exactly the same
properties"(p. 86) if a progressive equilibrium is disrupted as
when a stationary equilibrium is disrupted. That is, the character
of the response of a "regularly progressive economy" (in which
autonomous investment and equilibrium income are both rising
at the same, constant percentage rate) to a solitary deviation of
autonomous investment from its normal path depends on the
marginal propensity to consume and the investment coefficient—
just as in the case of stationary equilibrium which we just exam-
ined. It therefore seems natural to inquire which of the various
possibilities turned up by theory "is most likely to correspond
with actual experience, and which of them could be an element
in the explanation of a cycle such as we find in reality"(p. 89).
It appears that, once the rate of growth of the system is given,
an investment coefficient of a particular size will yield a perfectly
regular cycle. Hicks rejects this possibility because it seems rather
unlikely that the "world...hadgot stuck for two centuries with
an investment coefficient"(p. 89) of this precise value. Another
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hypothesis is that, given the marginal propensity to consume, the
investment coefficient has been such as to yield damped oscillations.
In this case, of course, "a single disturbance cannot produce the
fairly regular cycle which has been experienced" (p. 89); but may
not a stream of disturbances following thickly on one another
keep the cycle from vanishing? Hicks feels that this "theory of
damped fluctuations and erratic shocks" (p. gi) is also unconvinc-
ing. The hypothesis he embraces is that the marginal propensity to
consume and the investment coefficient are of such size as to gen-
erate "explosive cycles" or even outright "explosions." At first
blush this seems utterly implausible, and so it would be if Hicks
stopped here. But Hicks goes on to impose limits on output—
something I failed to do in tracing the consequences of a disturb-
ance of stationary equilibrium. The upper limit is fixed by the
"scarcity of employable resources" (p. 95), so that there is a "full
employment ceiling"(p. g6). Although there is no direct lower
limit on output, one is indirectly provided by the fact that "dis-
investment in fixed capital can only take place by a cessation of
gross investment"(p. ioi). This hypothesis of "constrained ex-
plosion," Hicks feels, "is the one which really fits the facts" (p. 92).
To see how the model works, it is simpler to take his stationary
than his progressive equilibrium as a point of departure. Let us
therefore revert to our preceding illustration with its solitary
burst of autonomous investment. The consumption function we
can leave unchanged; but we must now raise the investment co-
efficient to suit its "explosive" mission, and we must also put limits
on output. Let us say that the investment coefficient is 2, that the
ceiling to output in any period is 130, and that disinvestment in
any period cannot exceed 6. In period i total output and its com-
ponents. are now the same as in the previous illustration. In period
2 consumption is again 104.5; but the induced investment is io
and total output 114.5. In period 3 consumption is 113.05; the
required investment is i; but, since output cannot exceed130,
investment is only 16.95. In period4 consumption is 127, and the
output ceiling keeps investment down to 3. In period5 consump-
tion remains at 127, since output in period4 is the same as in
periodfor the same reason induced investment is zero, and the
expansion in output is not only halted but converted intoa de-
cline. In period 6 consumption, reflecting the lower output in
period 5, falls to 124.3; induced investment becomes —6 and total
output 118:3. In the next period the required disinvestment is
17.4; but, since disinvestment cannot be more than 6, surplus
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capacity emerges, which will have to be worked off in later periods.
The accelerator mechanism is now suspended, and the multiplier
carries on by itself. Total output keeps declining, period after
period, but the decreases in output become progressively smaller.
If the disinvestment continued at 6, a new equilibrium output of
40 would be gradually approached. However, asthe change in
output becomes smaller, so too does the required disinvestment.
When the change in output is numerically smaller than —,the
disinvestment required in any period can already be carried out in
that period. For a time, however, the disinvestment must remain
at 6 to allow the unfulfilled disinvestments of earlierperiods to be
consummated. Once this process is completed, the accelerator goes
into action again; the disinvestment now becomes smaller than 6,
and before long the decline in disinvestment more than offsets
the decline in consumption; in other words, total output again
rises. From this point consumption as well as investment must
increase; both advance energetically until the ceiling is hit, which
chokes off the accelerator and sets off a fresh decline.
In this model the expansion of output is carried forward by the
combined action of the multiplier and accelerator mechanisms.
The expansion cannot taper off into a plateau, with output re-
maining at the ceiling level, because the decline in the rate of
increase in output generates an absolute decline of investment.
When output bumps along the ceiling, the induced investment
must soon be zero; and the decline of investment cannot be offset
by a rise of consumption, since consumption is determined by
earlier outputs and the output along the ceiling is not rising. Thus
the cyclical downturn of output is fundamentally due to a re-
tardation in the growth of output itself, and the ceiling is suffi-
cient to produce the retardation. So it is also in Hicks' regularly
progressive economy, where the ceiling keeps rising but only at
the moderate rate at which autonomous investment is rising. In
both the stationary and the regularly progressive models the mul-
tiplier mechanism is responsible for the protracted contraction of
output. But, whereas in the former model there cannot be a re-
sumption of the expansion until excess capital has been worked
off, in the latter model the continued growth of autonomous in-
vestment will check the decline of output and enable it to rise
again before the surplus capacity has been eliminated; the re-
sumption of a rise in output hastens the adjustment of the stock
of ordinary capital to output; and, when this adjustment is com-
pleted, induced investment adds its strength to that of autonomous
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investment in driving the economy forward. Thus, in the regu-
larly progressive economy the accelerator is suspended, not only
during practically the whole of contraction as in the stationary
economy, but also during the early part of the expansion. But the
intermittent activity of the accelerator should not mislead us con-
cerning its role as a cycle maker. If the accelerator failed to func-
tion at all, there would be no cycle in the model; on the other
hand, a multiplier of unity would not alone suffice to obliterate
the fluctuations. Thus it is permissible to say, in the interest of
brevity, that induced investment or the accelerator is principally
responsible for the cycle.
This, as I read Hicks, is the essence of his theory. To besure,
the theory has more flexibility than my sketchconveys. Hicks
recognizes that there is no technical limit on disinvestment in in-
ventories, such as characterizes fixed capital. However, in line with
the general drift of his argument, which rather minimizes the part
of inventories,' he feels that "the accelerator, in the form in which
it persists into the slump, is a mere ghost of what itwas in the
Boom" (p. 104). He recognizes that autonomous investmentcan-
not be expected to follow a regularly rising path in actual life and
that "it must experience autonomous fluctuationson its own ac-
count"(p. 120); but he regards these fluctuations as "superim-
posed upon the cycle" (p. 12 i) of a regularly progressiveeconomy.
He does not insist that the boom is always killed off by hitting
the ceiling; on the contrary he shows that the investment coeffi-
cient may be "explosive" and yet generatea decline before the
ceiling is struck—though here, too, the retarded growth ofoutput
is responsible for the decline in investment and the eventual down-
turn of output. Again, Hicks' theory requires uniformity in the
consumption and investment functions overany one cycle, but not
from one cycle to the next. Nor does the theory necessarily depend
on the simple lags of my exposition.' These various elements of
flexibility leave, as Hicks sees it, "plenty ofroom for those di-
vergences from a standard model which are needed in order to
cover the historical facts"(p. 3).
As a result of his inquiry Hicks deems it possibleto point to "a
short list of fundamental facts whichare sufficient to account for
the cycle" (p. 3). Let us assemble this list of "facts"or "assump-
15Seethe authoritative study of Abramovitz (op.cit.), whichgoes a considerable
distance towards establishing the highly significant role of inventories in the business
cycle.
16However,certain types of lag may cause serious embarrassment, as Hicksrecog-
nizes, though perhaps insufficiently.
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tions" (pp.2,83, 92, 95):(i) Consumption is a lagged function
of income; induced investment is a lagged function of the change
in income; and these functions are such that "an upward displace-
ment from the equilibrium path will tend to cause a movement
away from equilibrium." (2) The system has an upward trend of
output geared to autonomous investment. (3) "Output is not in-
definitely extensible against an increase in effective demand."
()"Fallsin output cannot induce disinvestment in the same way
as rises in output induce investment." From such a list of "assump-
tions," Hicks concludes, it is possible to show that "a cyclical se-
quence, which is (to say the least) remarkably similar to that which
is experienced in practice, is inevitable" (p.Hicks'italics).
This conclusion suggests more than Hicks has proved. By what
is "experienced in practice" Hicks cannot mean more than the
abstraction I previously delineated (Sec. I); which still leaves, even
if his theory turned out to be right, work for other times and
other hands. His argument concerning consumption, induced in-
vestment, even autonomous investment, runs in terms of effective
demand. On the processes whereby supply is adjusted to demand
his list of assumptions is distressingly inarticulate. It seems im-
possible to me to make a useful pronouncement about what is or
is not inevitable in Hicks' world until the tacit assumptions con-
cerning conditions of supply, apart from the ceiling to output and
floor of investment, have been spelled out. Aside from this, the
cycle in Hicks' expanding economy is, strictly speaking, a cycle in
deviations from an "equilibrium rate of growth," as he himself
elsewhere recognizes (p. ioi). Hence his assumptions do not nec-
essarily lead to an expansion of output followed by an absolute
decline of output; nor—therefore—necessarily to the sort of cycle
which has bothered the practical world.
But I do not wish to multiply doubts along these lines. From
the viewpoint of a theory which aims to be something more than
an exercise in logic, the important issues, as I see them, lie else-
where. The foundation stones of Hicks' theory are the multiplier
and accelerator. These are the matters on which I have dwelt in
earlier parts of this paper. And if what I have said on these sub-
jects is at all valid, it will not do to treat consumption as a tech-
nical echo of output; it will not do to treat investment as a tech-
nical echo of the changes in past output; it will not do to treat
the business cycle as a reflex of any "technical necessities of a
capital-using economy." To come to grips with the economic re-
alities of a capitalistic system, which is a capital-using economy of
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a very particular sort, it is necessary to give far greater scope to
market phenomena—the movements of costs, prices, profits, credit,
and business sentiment itself—than one finds in Hicks.
V
The process of investing in fixed capital, which plays the key role
in Hicks' theory of the cycle, cannot be understood outside its
business setting. I have already commented on the imperfect di-
visibility of industrial facilities and their long period of gestation.
In view of these characteristics of investments goods, a business
firm will normally seek to have a margin of plant capacity to take
care of contingencies, both such as may be foreseen and such as
cannot, just as it normally carries a reserve of raw materials and
finished wares in its inventories. Seasonal maxima—which some-
times exceed the average for a year by more than cyclical maxima
exceed the average for a cycle_will be realized by working the
plant more intensively, not by varying its scale. So also will the
responses to sudden and irregular fiutterings of demand, which
are an ever present feature of business life and sometimes strong
enough to leave their impress on fairly comprehensive economic
aggregates. And the firm will look to the future, not only to the
past—as in Hicks' model. There the increase in output comes first;
the "investment in new capital to support that increased output"
(p. comeslater. But in a growing economy a firm relies on
"increased output" to support "investment in new capital" just
as it relies on "investment in new capital" to support "increased
output."
A new business commonly begins operations with a modest
plant. As sales expand, all sorts of inconvenience and wasteare
suffered for a time. A year or two later better equipmentmay be
added and perhaps a site acquired to accommodate a larger plant
in case that proves necessary. As sales keep mounting,a new fac-
tory is built or a substantial addition made to the old. This may
come soon or years later, but in either event the plant is expanded
with an eye to what output may be several years henceas well as
to its current level. In time the business becomes cramped for
space once again, and the cycle of development is repeated. This,
or something like it,is typically the investment path of a small
business as it grows up. In a stationary firm or one thatgrows very
slowly, the intervals between capital expenditures will ofcourse
be longer than in a rapidly growing business. And what is true of
a manufacturing concern is equally true of farming, mining, corn-
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mercial, or financial enterprises. Thus, investment in plant and
equipment on the part of a small or medium-sized business comes
in substantial lumps, discontinuously. And while the investment
of large firms seems continuous by comparison, this merely reflects
the overlapping of many processes of the same kind, going on in
various sections of the firm, combined with th•e fact that the proj-
ects undertaken are apt to be much larger and therefore remain
longer in the stage separating the investment decision and the
final installation.
In the actual world, therefore, the stock of capital in the indi-
vidual firm cannot well move in any close adjustment to its output
in the short run. If we broaden our view over the whole of an
industry, we encounter a fresh impediment to the acceleration
principle in the formation of new firms, which undertake new
investment although they are still innocent of any past output.
And if the economic process as a whole comes into view, the link-
age between current investment and the rate of change in output
seems to vanish in a cloud. One railroad is built by a dreamer who
sees bustling centers of industry and commerce when he looks at
pasture and forest. Another is built by a wily promoter who sees
an opportunity to embarrass a rival railroad or to appease the
public's hunger for securities. One firm builds a factory to in-
corporate a new technical process, another to make a new product,
a third because it is cramped for space, or because it has new busi-
ness in prospect, or because it wishes to acquire a 'new look,' or
because a new location promises lower taxes or a cheaper labor
supply. One independent builder 'sees' a housing shortage and
lays down a score of new dwellings. At the same time a colleague
'sees' that the residential market is overbuilt but nevertheless puts
up a house or two to keep his organization intact; while a third,
who shares the somber vision of the second, adds liberally to the
supply of houses because he can borrow from his banker as much
or more than what it costs him to build.
There is no need to enlarge on these remarks. It is clear that
numerous influences play on investment and that one or another
special influence is sometimes decisive in the individual case. This
suffices to show why hardly a day passes in a large country without
bringing forth a new crop of investment projects and why their
volume must vary over time. But the special influences do not ex-
plain the heavy bunching of investment projects at certain times,
their sparse numbers at other times, the fairly regular ascent from
small numbers to large and the fairly regular descent from large
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numbers to small—in short, why there is a cyclical movement in
investment. To explain this feature of investment, it is necessary
to abstract from the multitude of special influences and to analyze
the forces that govern fairly homogeneous sections of the invest-
ment market—such as free versus controlled industries, large- ver-
sus small-scale industries, new versus old enterprises, housing
versus business enterprises, private versus governmental agencies,
and so on. Once separate generalizations have been framed for the
leading parts of the investment market, it becomes possible to de-
termine with assurance how the broad forces of the market—prin-
cipally, the movement of the national income and its distribution,
the movement of building and equipment costs, and the move-
ments of 'finance'—impinge on investment at large. All these mat-
ters still require empirical investigation; but enough is already
known to make it fairly clear that it is the pervasive forces of the
market, rather than Hicks' mechanical accelerator, that give rise
to fluctuations in a community's outlays on fixed capital.
Suppose, for example, that an expansion in aggregate output
and employment has for some reason gotten under way. Then the
income of individuals and business firms will expand also. Since
the community as a whole is better off, spending on consumption
goods rises; and so too does spending on investment goods—many
of which seemed "necessary" months or years earlier but which
were not acquired earlier because of financial stringency or busi-
ness uncertainty. As spending expands, new 'shortages' appear,
and men's minds turn to ways of meeting them. The spread of
expansion gradually generates in people a feeling of security, later
a mood of optimism. Many who have been eager to carry out new
investments, and yet have postponed action because uncertain
whether the time is 'right,' decide to go ahead now, whilecon-
struction and equipment costs are still close to the level reached
during the preceding slump. The new spirit of enterprise fosters
all sorts of projects that are related very loosely, if at all, to the
shortages of facilities which keep arising here and thereor to the
improved ability of investors to pay for new facilities. Individual
dishoarding is now easier to rationalize, credit is easier toget, and
equity capital easier to attract. Many families that in thepast have
dreamed about building a home 'decide' to build one, insome
cases because their income is larger, in others because they feel
more secure about their income or because lenders feel this way
about them, in still others because they look forward confidently
to still better times. Business firms brush up their long-range plans
262HICKS AND THE REAL CYCLE
costs will be reduced before long from the abnormal level to which
they have been pushed by prosperity.
It is along lines such as these, I believe, that the cyclical down-
turns of investment in fixed capital are to be explained, if we hold
in view an economy organized predominantly on the basis of free
private enterprise. In Hicks' system the expansion of investment
is brought to a halt and reversed by a mere retardation in the
growth of physical output. But I do not know of any evidence
that a declining rate of growth has generally characterized the
closing stages of actual expansions in aggregate output'8 or that
investment expenditure has been at all closely geared to the actual
rate of growth of output. Even if empirical evidence fitted in more
congenially with Hicks' theory of the downturn, it would still be
wise for the economist, when in search for the causes of the break-
down of an investment boom, to look in the direction of business
life, including the government once it has become a major factor
in the economy, rather than in the direction of Hicks' hypothetical
technology. And it is to the processes of business life that Hicks
himself seems to turn when he comes to the case of an upturn in
investment. That depends in his system on the continued advance
or spurt of autonomous investment; and while his autonomous
investment merits another name and more analysis than it re-
ceives, it at least opens the route along which business processes
might be seen.
VI
Hicks' slight of psychological and pecuniary factors is deliberate.
At the opening of his penultimate chapter he states plainly: "It
has been one of the main objects of this work to show that the
main features of the cycle can be adequately explained in real
terms"(p.136). In line with this resolution there is hardly a
mention of the price or monetary systems in the first eight of his
twelve chapters. In Chapter IX Hicks concedes that "it is very
possible that some important aspects of the actual cycle can only
be explained" by the aid of "the price-mechanism and the mone-
tary mechanism" (p. 117). In Chapter X he examines the con-
sequences of a supposed cyclical movement in the ratio of invest-
ment goods prices to consumption goods prices; but the only re-
suit derived is a blurring "at the edges" of the previous argument
18 See the study of this subject by Abramovitz, op.cit., Chap. xv. On the technical
difficulties in ascertaining rates of change over a cycle, see A. F. Burns and W. C.
Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946),
Chap.viii.
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(p.'33). The last two chapters are devoted to the "monetary
factor," which he regards as a "secondary force" whose effects are
"superimposed" on the "main cycle" (p.Hicks'italics). I shall
say nothing of this interesting monetary supplement. To examine
it at all adequately would require not much less space than I have
already taken; and it is perhaps just as well to leave the emphasis
where Hicks himself has put it.
This emphasis on the 'technical' or 'real' aspects of economic
life is not peculiar to Hicks' new book. It has been characteristic
of a good part of recent economic theory, just as it was character-
istic of a good part of classical political economy in its formative
phase. The emphasis is an understandable and, to a considerable
degree, a justifiable reaction against the price and monetary the-
orizing which flourished before the 1930's and which was found
so seriously wanting when the Great Depression struck. In the
midst of the confusion and despondency of the day, Keynes artic-
ulated a new theoretical system, couched in a wonderful language,
from which governmental policies seemed to peel off as simply
and naturally as skin from an onion. He saw in a business depres-
sion, not any maladjustment of costs and prices, but a deficiency
in spending, which he attributed principally to a deficiency in
investment. The latter he analyzed in terms of the supply of money,
liquidity preference, the supply price of investment goods, and
the expectations of the business community concerning the future
earnings stream from new investment. He put the emphasis on
the expected earnings stream in his theory of investment, just as
he put the emphasis on actual income in his theory of consump-
tion. He saw in investment the great driving force of employment,
but one that a modern society could not safely leave to the un-
restrained impulses of private enterprise. These teachings of
Keynes paved the way for drastic simplifications by later econ-
omists. Before long a literature arose in which costs, prices, and
profits were pushed aside, sometimes completely ignored. Con-
sumption emerged as a passive response to income, without any
link to the system of prices or the range of economic choice. In-
vestment became an exogenous variable—a mere technical datum
for the economist, like the consumption function. Investmentop-
portunity itself became a sort of physical fact; and not a few econ-
omists formed the habit of speaking of investment outletsas if
they were some objective quantity, independent of the dreams of
men, their hopes and fears about governmental policy, or their
expectations about Costs, prices, and profits.
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for expansion, promoters push projects that will exploit new
products or techniques, new firms are organized to share in the
growing markets for standard commodities, and legislatures au-
thorize improvements worthy of an 'era of prosperity.' Thus, as
everyone knows, a rising national income and the state of exalta-
tion that accompanies it pile up decisions to invest; and invest-
ment expenditures follow suit—though with an irregular lag and
diminished amplitude.
But why does not the expansion of investment continue more
or less indefinitely? By what processes is the upward movement
of investment brought to a halt and its direction reversed? Here
two facts are vital. First, the rise in construction and financing
costs generated by the expansion itself. In thinking of the invest-
merit process, it is essential to keep in mind that a 'decision to
invest' is one thing and a 'decision to invest now' is quite another.
Investors generally realize that building a new house, factory, or
power plant is not the same thing as purchasing a hat or even an
automobile. They know that when investment judgment proves
bad, the penalty is severe. In reaching a 'decision to invest,' they
may have given little or no conscious attention to the protracted
increase that has already occurred in construction and financing
costs. But this decision must be followed by another, whether to
carry out the project now or later. At this stage investors are
likely to consider very carefully the economic outlook in the
months immediately ahead. They know that they may have the
new plant or equipment on their hands for a generation and that
the annual carrying charges with which they saddle themselves
depend a good deal on the cost of construction, if no( also on the
rate of interest. They have gotten along thus far without the de-
sired investment and in any event will have to manage without
it for months or years—for as yet the investment good is only an
amorphous wish or a sketch on a piece of paper. In some cases a
postponement will clearly bring hardship or a business loss, and
the interval between the 'decision to invest' and the start of in-
vestment expenditure will be governed entirely by technical fac-
tors—such as surveying, acquiring a site, designing plans, securing
loans, contracting out the job, etc. In many other cases investors,
who judge that they can let the construction job and finance it on
appreciably better terms six months or a year later, will bide their
time. And not a few of those who are eager to move promptly will
have a chance to reconsider their 'decision to invest' in the light
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of market prospects, for the arrangements preparatory to invest-
ment expenditure are often very time-consuming.
The rise in construction and financing costs during an expan-
sion impinges broadly on the investing class and would check the
investment boom sooner or later even if prosperity diffused itself
uniformly over the economic community. But this does not hap-
pen, and the uneven spread of expansion is our second vital fact.
True, business conditions are generally good and improving; yet
some firms and even entire industries are unable to expand their
sales, and others find it hard to advance their selling prices. At
the same time unit costs of production are already rising over the
range of business enterprise—first here and there, then on a broad
front, despite improvements of technique and fuller utilization
of facilities. At every stage of the business cycle there are bound to
be some firms whose profits are declining or whose losses are in-
creasing. But these firms are not a steady fraction of the business
population; and after a business expansion has continued for some
time there are various reasons for expecting their numbers to
multiply. As a mounting optimism infects a widening circle of
businessmen, errors concerning the sales that can be made at
profitable prices tend to pile up. Supply 'bottlenecks' keep develop-
ing, now in one locality or industry, then in others; in consequence
the output of numerous enterprises—particularly those suffering
from a shift in demand or an outworn technology—is restricted.
Business custom, long-term contracts, or governmental regulation
make it difficult or inexpedient for many firms to raise their prices;
and, as the rise in unit costs continues, more and more of them
are apt to find their profits diminishing. We therefore find in ex-
perience, as we may reasonably expect, that "after a business ex-
pansion has run for some time, the proportion of firms experienc-
ing rising profits begins to shrink, although the profits of business
in the aggregate continue to climb." This development adds to
the mood of hesitation that is already emerging among investors
generally, on account of the protracted rise in construction and
financing costs. The firms whose fortunes are waning are likely
to be among the first to reduce investment expenditure, and their
curtailments will spread doubt among others whose profits are
still rising, but many of which have come to feel that investment
iT [See New Facts on Business Cycles, above, pp. 107-134]; and Thor Hultgren,
Cyclical Diversities in the Fortunes of Industrial Corporations, National Bureau
Occasional Paper 32 (1950).
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It is against this background that I see Hicks' book on the busi-
ness cycle. It is based on a profound appreciation ofthe work of
Keynes, yet consciously departs from Keynes' doctrines at numer-
ous points. It is written in a scholarly spirit and isdevoted to
scientific issues, not to questions of immediate policy. It is a so-
phisticated work, not to be confused with vulgar Keynesianism.
It shares, however, the aggregative, mechanical, 'real' slant of much
of the recent literature on economic theory. It stresses the role of
effective demand but has practically nothing to say about the
organization and conditions of effective supply. It sees investment
as an addition to output but overlooks its part in modifying the
state and intensity of competition in the business world. It re-
stores investment to an endogenous role, which it had long played
in earlier economic theory, including that of Keynes; but the
restoration is carried out through a theorem of impersonal tech-
nology, not of human conduct in a business environment. The
sophistication of Hicks' work derives from the pressures of a subtle
and inquiring mind, not from a large knowledge of practical af-
fairs or the teachings of history and statistics. The result is a closely
reasoned'9 and attractively written essay about a possible cycle,
but—as far as I can see—a dubious aid to students seriously con-
cerned with the actual alternations of good and bad trade to which
the Western world has been subject in modern times.
19Althoughthe book Sets a very high standard in this respect, a professional
logician might yet have something to say about Hicks' method of arriving at what is
or is not "probab1e' both in his explicitly supposititious world and in the alleged
real one.
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